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BIANNUAL SURVEY

not lie where another remedy is available or provided by law.
An Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus can be used
to compel a justice to exercise the discretion he possesses by virtue
of his position, but cannot be used3 0to2 compel him to exercise his
discretion in any particular manner.
Particularity of statements in Article 78 pleadings.
Section 7804(d) is the only section in Article 78 pertaining to
pleadings, and it provides, in part, that the "petition . . . shall
comply with the rules for a complaint in an action. . . ." That
requires cross-reference to CPLR 3013. This section does not
require the pleading of "material facts," which was required under
Section 241 of the Civil Practice Act, and there is no longer the
prohibition of section 241 as to the pleading of "evidence." Under
CPLR 3013 all that is required of the pleading is that it be
sufficiently particular to furnish the parties and the court with
notice of the "transactions" or "occurrences" that the pleader intends
to prove. "Pleadings should not be dismissed or ordered amended
unless the allegations therein are not sufficiently particular to
apprise the court and parties of the subject matter of the controversy." 303 To date, the leading case construing the CPLR in
this area is Foley v. D'Agostino,30" wherein the court held that
statements in a pleading are sufficiently particular if when "viewed
with reason and liberality" they "give the defendants notice of the
plaintiffs' claims . ..
and of the elements of plaintiffs' alleged
cause of action.

,,305

Gallagher GMC Sales Corp. v. Central School Dist. No. 1 306
involved an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus. One
of the questions the court was confronted with was whether the
statements in the petition were sufficiently particular. The petition
contained conclusory allegations that did in fact inform the court
and respondents of the specific transaction that the petitioner was
complaining of, yet the court felt that the statements were not sufficiently particular to make out a cause of action, stating that "conclusory allegations not supported by facts need not be considered
" 307

The court appears to have held that it is necessary to have
specific allegations of fact in a petition, even though the so-called
302
Kahn v. Backer, 21 App. Div. 2d 171, 249 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1st Dep't
1964); see CPLR 7801(1).
3033 WEimsTlN, KoRN & MILLER, NEv YoRic Csvn. PRAcTicE 113013.03
(1963).
30421 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1964).
305Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 68, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 129
(1st Dep't 1964).
306 43 Misc. 2d 360, 251 N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
307 Gallagher GMC Sales Corp. v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 43 Misc. 2d
360,-, 251 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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"legal conclusions" and "allegations of wrong doing" did apprise
the parties and court of the particular transactions complained of.
By requiring specific allegations of facts in the petition, the court
actually required a more detailed and stricter pleading than is
required in an action. 308 Though the procedures of the special
proceeding are more summary and expeditious than those of an
action,30 9 one may argue that a petition giving the respondent "notice
of the transactions . . . intended to be proved . . ." 310 affords him

ample basis on which to oppose it. In that light, there is practical
reason, too, for using 3013's criteria for pleadings in actions as the
criteria to govern petitions in special proceedings. A counterpoise
here is that the special proceeding is less appropriate to the use of
disclosure devices (though they are available there 311) than is an
action, for which reason it may be incumbent upon a petition to
be more informative than a comolaint. These factors were not
investigated by the court. The CPLR itself was apparently satisfied
to make 3013's criteria applicable, by cross-reference, not only to
the petition in an Article 78 proceeding, 312 but to the petition in all
special proceedings governed by the CPLR .3 1 This point does not
appear to have been urged in the Gallagher case. That case, moreover, appears to have been disposed of on the merits rather than
on the mere omissions of pleading, though these omissions are
referred to by the court.
ARTICLE 80-

FEES

Poundage fees.
314

Morris v. Morris

involved an application by a sheriff for

poundage fees. The sheriff served a copy of an execution on a
garnishee. After the garnishee's refusal to deliver the property
(a promissory note) to the sheriff, the judgment creditor instituted
a special proceeding against the garnishee under CPLR 5225 and
5227 (as contemplated by 5232(a)) to compel surrender of the
note. The court granted the poundage fees, holding that the
sheriff was entitled to poundage notwithstanding the fact that it
was necessary for the judgment creditor to bring a proceeding when
the garnishee failed to turn the note over to the sheriff pursuant
to the levy. The judgment creditor prevailed in the proceeding,
and payment of the note was made directly to plaintiff's attorneys
308 See the Foley case, supra, note 305.
309 CPLR Art. 4; see 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRACrICE 401.01 (1963).
310 CPLR 3013.
311 See CPLR 408.

CPLR 7804(d).
See CPLR 402.
14 43 Misc. 2d 854, 252 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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